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IMPAIRMENT OF THE OPERATION OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION BY RECENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, commonly known as the Warsaw
Convention,' is one of the most widely accepted and, at the same
time, most heavily criticized of all private international agree-
ments.' The principal effect of the Warsaw Convention is that,
when applicable,' it limits the liability of air carriers for damages
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
(1929) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention was the result of
conferences held at Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929. The United States was not an official
party to the conferences; however, it acceded to the Warsaw Convention in 1934 following
the advice and consent of the Senate. For an excellent discussion of the history of the War-
saw Convention and the events which led to the various documents which have modified the
original agreement, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 HAav. L. REv. 497 (1967).
' The Warsaw Convention has been ratified by 117 countries. Only the United Nations
Charter has been accepted by more nations. The parties to the Convention are listed in
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA GAzEttE G18, May 8, 1979, at 16.
Although many aspects of the Warsaw Convention have been subject to controversy over
the years, the bulk of the criticism has been directed at those provisions which permit air
carriers to limit their liability for damages arising out of international air travel. See gener-
ally Hollings, Defeat of the Montreal Protocols: Victory for Airline Passengers, 19 TRIAL 21
(May 1983); Moller, The Warsaw Convention: Can it Survive?, reprinted in 129 CONG. REC.
§2272 (daily ed. March 8, 1983); Podgers, Aviation Law: Changes in the Wind?, 11 BRIEF 26,
26-31 (1982); Hollings, Montreal Protocols: A Threat to the American System of Jurispru-
dence, 18 TRIAL 69, 69-70 (1982); Kean, Checking the Bags: Collins v. British Airways
Board, J. Bus. L. 144 (Mar. 1982); Gerry, Aviation Consumer Ripoff (President's Page), 18
TRIAL 6 (Feb. 1982); Note, A Proposed Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 57 INDIANA L.
REV. 297 (1982); Bockstiegel, Some Recent Efforts for a Fundamental Reconsideration of
the International Aviation Liability System, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 17 (1980); Mateesco-
Matte, Should the Warsaw System be Denounced or "Integrated'?, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 201 (1980); Note, Extension of the Warsaw Convention's Protection: Julius Young Jew-
elry Mfg. Co. v. Delta Airlines (414 N.Y.S.2d 528), 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 497
(1980); Loggans, Personal Injury Damages in International Aviation Litigation: The
Plaintiff's Perspective, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 541 (1980); Comment, Revised Warsaw Conven-
tion and Other Aviation Disasters, 8 CUM. L. REv. 763 (1978); Landry, Swift, Sure and
Equitable Recovery-A Developing Concept in International Aviation Litigation, 47
N.Y.S.B.J. 372 (1975); Note, The Warsaw Treaty: The Quid Pro Quo, 29 U. Prrr. L. Rav.
253 (1967).
3 The Convention applies "to all international carriage of persons, luggage, or goods per-
formed by aircraft for reward." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
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arising out of accidents involving international flights.4 Most of the
criticism to which the Warsaw Convention has been subjected has
focused upon dissatisfaction with the limitation of liability provi-
sions.5 However, many commentators have failed to note that even
if the liability limits were deemed sufficient, there is a technical
problem in applying the terms of the Warsaw Convention.
The technical problem is straightforward. To enforce liability
limits under the Warsaw Convention, courts must have a method
for converting the limit provided for in the Warsaw Convention
into an equivalent amount in domestic currency. In Franklin Mint
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that there was no legally valid stan-
dard of conversion under the Convention, and, consequently, the
court declared the liability limits for damage to cargo unenforce-
able.7 The facts of Franklin Mint involved only cargo. Therefore,
the court did not address whether the liability limits relating to
personal injury also would be considered unenforceable.8 Without
an officially sanctioned standard of conversion, the technical weak-
ness identified in Franklin Mint could endanger the Warsaw Con-
vention's limitation of liability for personal injury as well as the
liability limits for loss of cargo.
This issue took on a new importance on March 8, 1983 when the
United States Senate rejected the Montreal Protocols9 which
International transportation, for purposes of the Convention, means "any carriage in
which, according to the contract made by the Parties, the place of departure and the place
of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage.., are situated ... within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
' For an explanation of the Warsaw Convention liability limits, see infra notes 15-23 and
accompanying text.
See supra note 2.
690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 311.
At least one district court has relied upon the reasoning in Franklin Mint to declare the
Warsaw Convention limitation of liability for personal injury unenforceable. See infra note
82 and accompanying text.
9 Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12th October 1929 as
Amended by the Protocols Done at The Hague on 28th September 1955 and at Guatemala
City on 8th March 1971, done at Montreal on September 25, 1975 (ICAO Doc. No. 9417)
[hereinafter cited as Montreal Protocol No. 3]; Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12th October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on
8th September 1955, done at Montreal on September 25, 1975 (ICAO Doc. No. 9148) [here-
inafter cited as Montreal Protocol No. 4], reprinted in C. SHAwcRoss & M. BEAUMONT, AIR
LAW A242-256 (4th ed. 1982) (status as of April 1982). The Senate considered the Montreal
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would have amended the Warsaw Convention. The protocols would
have provided for a new standard of conversion,0 thereby resolv-
ing the issue raised by Franklin Mint. The technical problem
presented in Franklin Mint is beyond the power of the Second
Circuit to remedy."
If it were within the power of the court to select a new conver-
sion standard, it is unclear whether the court would do so or
whether it would allow the Warsaw Convention system of limited
liability to falter because of judicial dissatisfaction with the low
level of the liability limits. The widespread belief that the liability
limits have become insufficient over time 2 has resulted in courts'
being torn between conflicting policy goals in considering Warsaw
Convention cases. They want to provide an adequate recovery for
those killed or injured in aircraft accidents; however, they also un-
derstand the needs to maintain an internationally uniform treat-
ment of claims and to shield airlines from the potentially catas-
trophic financial effects of liability for a major air crash. This
conflict is manifested in judicial interpretation of the Warsaw Con-
vention provisions determining whether the liability limits apply.
In Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"5 the Second Circuit applied
an unusually liberal interpretation of the ticketing provisions of
the Convention to hold that the Warsaw Convention limitation of
liability provisions could be applied to a passenger who was con-
templating an international flight, but who held a ticket solely for
domestic travel. 14 The court's opinion in Stratis indicates support
for the underlying principles of the Warsaw Convention liability
limits and raises some doubts as to whether the court truly would
desire to invalidate the Convention altogether.
The first section of this Note will discuss the problem presented
by Franklin Mint. In order to discuss the technical problem raised
by that case, it is useful to review the history of the use of gold as a
standard of conversion in transportation conventions and to survey
Protocols on March 8, 1983. The vote was 50 in favor of ratification and 42 against. Two-
thirds of the Senators present must vote affirmatively in order to ratify a treaty; therefore,
the Senate's advice and consent was withheld. For the Senate's debate on the Montreal
Protocols, see 129 CONG. REC. S2235-62 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) and 129 CONG. R.c.
S2270-79 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
"0 The Montreal Protocols would replace the use of the franc Poincarg with a monetary
unit known as the Standard Drawing Right (SDR). See infra note 57.
" See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
s See supra note 2.
13 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982).
', Id. at 412-14.
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the various approaches taken by foreign courts in defining a con-
version standard under the Warsaw Convention. The second sec-
tion will examine the Stratis decision and the implications of that
decision on the policy issues associated with the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Finally, this Note will analyze the prospects for a lasting solu-
tion to the confusion and debate which have surrounded the War-
saw Convention for more than fifty years.
II. THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
The original limitation of liability for personal injuries under ar-
ticle 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention was 125,000 francs, or ap-
proximately $4,898. A doubling of the limit, to 250,000 francs, was
agreed upon at a special diplomatic conference convened in 1955 at
The Hague."' Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
eventually recommended ratification of the protocol which resulted
from that meeting," it was never put to a vote before the full Sen-
ate because of objections to an accompanying proposal for
mandatory insurance.1 7
A second increase in the limitation of liability for death and per-
sonal injury occurred in 1966 following the threatened denuncia-
tion"8 of the Warsaw Convention by the Johnson administration.
The United States gave notice of denunciation on November 15,
1965, to become effective on May 15, 1966. The State Department
press release announcing the denunciation stated that the United
States was prepared to withdraw its denunciation if, before the ef-
fective date, there was "a reasonable prospect of an international
agreement on limits of liability in international air transportation
in the area of $100,000 per passenger or on uniform rules but with-
out any limit of liability, and if, pending the effectiveness of such
agreement, there is a provisional arrangement among the principal
international airlines waiving the limits of liability up to $75,000
" See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 504-09.
1" Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12th October 1929, The Hague, ICAO
Doc. No. 7632, (1955) [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol].
" Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Montreal Aviation Protocols Nos. 3 and 4, S.
ExEc. REP. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as S. ExEc. REP. No. 45].
For a detailed account of the United States consideration of the Hague Protocol, see
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 509.
8 As applied to treaties, the term "denounce" indicates "the act of one nation in giving
notice to another nation of its intention to terminate an existing treaty between the two
nations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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per passenger." '
A special meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) was convened at Montreal in February 1966 to ad-
dress the problem. At that meeting, which ended in a deadlock,
only one country supported the United States proposal for a limit
of $100,000, and forty countries voted against it." ° Nevertheless,
the United States withdrew its denunciation the day before it was
to have become effective because the principal United States and
foreign airlines reached a special inter-carrier agreement, popularly
known as the Montreal Agreement, in which the carriers agreed to
accept a liability limit of $75,000.21
The liability limit for property loss has remained at 250 francs
as article 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides. The dollar
value of the limit, however, was adjusted in 1974 to reflect the de-
valuation of the dollar relative to gold. 2
Currently, then, the liability limits are $75,000 per passenger for
death or personal injury and $9.07 per pound for damage or loss of
property. The Montreal Protocols, which recently were rejected by
the United States Senate,"3 would have raised the limitation of lia-
bility for personal injury to approximately $117,000, with an addi-
tional $200,000 recovery possible through a supplemental insur-
ance plan. The liability limit for property loss would have been
approximately $17.00 per kilogram under the Protocols.
III. Franklin Mint v. Trans World Airlines: THE TECHNICAL
PROBLEM
The limitation of liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention
use the "official" price of gold as a standard of conversion to
achieve uniform values for liability limits in a variety of different
currencies. Although gold proved to be a satisfactory conversion
standard for many years, the United States, like a number of other
nations, abandoned the official price of gold in 1978. This action
prompted the Second Circuit in Franklin Mint to declare the War-
50 DP'T ST. BULL. 923 (1965).
S. ExEc. REP. No. 45, supra note 17, at 2.
Agreement Relating to Liability Limits of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Pro-
tocol, Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Agreement 18900, approved by order F-23680, May
13, 1966 [hereinafter cited as the Montreal Agreement]. For a detailed discussion of the
events which led to the formation of the Montreal Agreement, see Lowenfeld & Mendel-
sohn, supra note 1, at 546-601.
" See infra note 68.
"8 See supra note 9.
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saw Convention liability limit unenforceable because of a lack of a
legally enforceable standard of conversion.
A. Historical Development of Gold as a Standard of Conversion
in Limitation of Liability Clauses
Limitation of liability clauses tied to the value of gold were used
first in two conventions signed at Brussels on August 22, 1924
(1924 Conventions).24 Five years later, a similar, although more
specific, gold clause was included in the Warsaw Convention.2 5 The
liability limits of the 1924 Conventions were tied to the gold pound
sterling, 6 while the Warsaw Convention limits used the French
franc Poincark.27 Other international transport agreements have
used the franc de germinal.28
Serious problems arose under these early gold clauses as a result
of provisions which permitted some countries to convert the gold
liability limits into sums expressed in terms of their own curren-
cies. 29 The failure of the 1924 Conventions to specify when the
conversion must be made was taken by many member states to
mean that it could be made at any time and that states were not
required to change the amount of their currency set by domestic
law, even if the value of their currency in relation to the gold stan-
14 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Lim-
itation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, signed at Brussels Aug. 25, 1924, and the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading,
opened for signature Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931 (1925) [hereinafter referred to
as the Hague Rules Conventions.]
" The Hague Rules Conventions, id., set a limitation of liability based on the gold value
of the British pound sterling. However, they fail to specify the weight and fineness of gold
which the pound sterling represents. This deficiency was corrected in article 22 of the War-
saw Convention which provides that "It]he sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer
to the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrammes of gold millesimal fineness 900." War-
saw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(4). Millesimal fineness 900 means 90% pure gold.
$6 Id.
'7 The French franc Poincar6 was named after the prime minister in office at the time the
value of the franc was set at 65.5 milligrammes of gold at a millesimal fineness 900. Asser,
Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Currency
Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 645 (1974).
It was Prime Minister Poincar6 who originally requested that the First International Con-
ference of Private Air Law, held at Paris in 1925, discuss the need to provide a limitation of
liability for international air carriers. Id.; see also The History and Accomplishments of the
International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. Am L. 27,
30 (1932).
" The franc de germinal is another gold franc which derives its name from the French
statute of 7 germinal in the year XI (March 28, 1803) which fixed the gold parity of the
franc at 10/31 of a gram of gold millesimal fineness 900. Asser, supra note 27, at 646.
2" Id. at 648.
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dard of the 1924 Conventions subsequently changed.30 Having
adopted this position, most member nations stated in their legisla-
tion ratifying the 1924 Conventions a sum equal to the value of
their currency in relation to the gold standard at the time the
adopting legislation was passed."1 Thereafter, as the rates of ex-
change among the member states' currencies fluctuated, the vari-
ous values expressed in local currencies lost their equality and the
liability limits varied accordingly from nation to nation. The result
was to provide an international environment conducive to forum-
shopping.3 2 In an attempt to rectify this problem, provisions speci-
fying the date of conversion were included in the Hague Protocol
of 195511 and the Protocol to Amend the Hague Rules Convention,
signed at Brussels on February 23, 1968. 84
Once the initial problems related to the date of conversion were
settled, the gold standard proved to be a satisfactory conversion
device. By the mid-1960's, however, rapid fluctuations in the price
of gold on the world's free markets began to put a strain on the
gold reserves of many countries. 5 In early 1968, a severe depletion
of the United States gold reserve led the central banks of Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States to agree to dis-
0 Id.
31 Id.
" The following is an example of the potential for forum-shopping. The Hague Rules
Conventions, supra note 24, set a liability limit of 100 pounds sterling. The United States,
in writing that limit into the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46
U.S.C. §§1300-1315 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COGSA], converted the 100 pounds sterling
into $500. Subsequently, the dollar parity of the pound sterling dropped from approxi-
mately $5.00 per pound in 1936 to $2.80 per pound by 1949. This meant that the maximum
possible recovery in a British court was equal to only $280 at a time when it was possible to
obtain a $500 judgment in a United States court. As a result, it became advantageous for
owners of lost or damaged cargo carried by British vessels under bills of lading governed by
both British and United States COGSAs to bring suit whenever possible in United States
courts. See Asser, supra note 27, at 646.
'3 The Hague Protocol provides for the following sentence to be added to article 22:
"Conversion of the sums into national currencies other than gold shall, in case of judicial
proceedings, be made according to the gold value of such currencies at the date of the judge-
ment." Hague Protocol, supra note 16.
I" Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of
Law Relating to Bills of Lading Signed at Brussels on 25 August 1924, signed Feb. 23, 1968,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING 1388 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Protocol to Amend The Hague Rules Convention].
This protocol amends the gold clause of article IV, paragraph 5, to provide that "[the
date of conversion of the sum awarded into national currencies shall be governed by the law
of the Court seized of the case." Id. art. IV, para. 5.
Asser, supra note 27, at 650.
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continue supplying gold to private markets." This move by the
major international banks resulted in the creation of a "two-tier"
system of gold pricing-an official price set under the Bretton
Woods Agreement 7 and a fluctuating price set on the world's free
markets.38
The United States abandoned the official price of gold on April
1, 1978, by repealing the Par Value Modification Act of 1973.1e A
" In 1961, these banks had joined together in a multilateral agreement known as the
"gold pool." The purpose of the gold pool was to stabilize the price of gold on the London
market close to the price of U.S. $35 per ounce. As the price of gold on the private market
rose above that level, plus an allowed margin, these countries offered gold from their own
reserves for sale on the London market, a move designed to relieve the pressure from buy-
ers. This agreement served two purposes: it stabilized the price of gold in private trading
and it provided a mechanism for supplies of newly- minted gold to enter the marketplace.
The gold pool proved effective until the surge of speculative buying of gold which followed
the sterling devaluation of 1967, an event which cost the members of the gold pool some
U.S. $1,500 million in gold to counteract. A renewed surge of speculative buying occurred in
March 1968. This time, however, the speculation was accompanied by a widespread belief
that the "official" price of gold would be raised above U.S. $35 per ounce. The gold pool
attempted to meet this new wave of buying as they had met the 1967 increase. When their
effort failed to stabilize the price of gold, the seven members of the gold pool decided that
they would cease selling gold from their reserves to support the private market. See Heller,
The Value of the Gold Franc-A Different Point of View, 6 J. MAR. L. & Com. 73, 81-82
(1974); Gold, International Monetary Law: Change, Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 15 J.
INT'L L. & EcON. 323, 340 (1981); SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcS 686-88 (8th ed. 1970).
'7 See Bretton Woods Agreement Act, ch. 339, §2, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945)
(current version at 22 U.S.C. §286 (1976)). By this Act, the United States accepted the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, effective Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S 266 (1947), amended by Act of July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T.
2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 39 (1970), and Act of Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203,
T.I.A.S. No. 8937 (1978) [hereinafter cited as the Bretton Woods Agreement). The official
price of gold at the time of the Bretton Woods Agreement was U.S. $35 per troy ounce. This
price was revised twice. See infra note 48.
" The gold pool agreement to halt the sale of domestic gold reserves, see generally supra
note 36, provided, inter alia, that transactions among the countries' monetary authorities
would be conducted at the official price of gold (then U.S. $35 per ounce), plus or minus the
prescribed margin, and that all other transactions would be carried out at free market
prices. Thus, a "two-tier" system of gold pricing was established, and an issue was raised as
to which was the appropriate standard of conversion under the Warsaw Convention, the
official price of gold or the price on the world's free markets. See Heller, supra note 36, at
82; see also Kelly, Two-Tier Gold: Who is Right? THE BANKER 600 (1968); Gold, supra note
36, at 340-41.
' The last official price of gold was set at U.S. $42.22 per troy ounce by the Par Value
Modification Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-110, §1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (codified at 31
U.S.C. §449 (1976)). In 1976, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) presented a proposal
to delete gold as a monetary unit and to substitute a new unit of account known as the
Standard Drawing Right (SDR). See infra note 57. The plan, known as the Jamaica Ac-
cords, was passed by the members of the IMF to become effective on April 1, 1978. In
response, the United States passed implementing legislation which, inter alia, repealed the
Par Value Modification Act of 1973. See Pub. L. No. 94-564, §§6, 9, 90 Stat. 2661 (1976).
556
WARSAW CONVENTION IMPAIRMENT
number of nations joined the United States and discontinued all
use of the official price of gold.40 Following this action, which was
engendered by a feeling that the official price of gold "was totally
out of touch with economic and monetary reality,"'41 courts around
the world expressed a variety of opinions concerning the proper
construction of the gold clauses contained in article 22 of the War-
saw Convention.
B. Foreign Courts Adopt Different Conversion Standards
Because United States courts have considered the actions of for-
eign courts in addressing the issue of the correct standard of con-
version, a review of the various approaches which foreign courts
have taken is helpful.
In India, Greece, and Argentina, courts have ruled that the free-
market price of gold is to be used in determining liability limits
under the Warsaw Convention. In Kuwait Airways Corporation v.
Sanghi,2 the court reasoned that the wording of article 22(5),
which states that "conversion of the sums into national currencies
other than gold shall, in case of judicial proceedings, be made ac-
cording to the gold value of such currencies at the date of the judg-
ment," must be read to refer to the free-market price of gold be-
cause the government of India never has adopted the official price
of gold as established by the Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF).'5 Sanghi, however, ignores an impor-
tant fact about the Warsaw Convention: the IMF formulation for
the official price of gold was not conceived until 1945.", At the time
the Warsaw Convention was drafted, its framers clearly intended
the language to mean the official price of gold on the date of judg-
ment. The court states that the Convention grants it no authority
to adopt the IMF official price of gold when the government of
40 In theory, the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, effective Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 (1978), abandoned
the official price of gold for all 141 members of the IMF. In practice, however, a number of
states still use gold as a reserve asset. For a detailed description of the present uses of gold
as a monetary standard, see Gold, supra note 36, at 351-70.
" See, e.g., Franklin Mint v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d at 303-09.
Regular Appeal No. 54 of 1977 (Civil Station, Bangalore, India, Aug. 11, 1978) (availa-
ble at the library of the University of Georgia School of Law).
" Id. at 3-4. The language quoted does not appear in the 1929 Convention; it was added
by the Hague Protocol in 1955. Although India has adopted the Hague Protocol, the United
States has not. Thus, this language is non-binding in the United States.
" See supra note 37.
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India has not.4 It failed to note, however, that the Warsaw Con-
vention gives the court no authority to adopt the free-market price
of gold as a standard of conversion.
Zakoupolos v. Olympic Airways Corporation," a Greek case de-
cided in 1972, held that the free-market price of gold must have
been intended by the drafters of the Warsaw Convention because,
if the official price were used, the requirement of a calculation on
the date of judgment would serve no purpose since the price of
gold would be steady and unchanged.'7 In so reasoning, the court
failed to recall that the official price of gold was periodically sub-
ject to revision. Indeed, the official value of gold in the United
States was increased twice between 1929, when the Warsaw Con-
vention was drafted, and 1978, when the official price of gold was
abandoned."8 A more plausible explanation for the language of ar-
ticle 22, given the history of the application of the Warsaw Con-
vention,' 9 is that the liability limits are to be converted into local
currencies based on the official price of gold at the date of
judgment.
In Argentina, the court deciding the 1976 case of Florencia, Cia
de Seguros v. Varig S.A.50 justified the application of the free-mar-
ket price of gold by claiming that the Convention's drafters desired
that the standard of conversion be tied to a currency which is de-
fined by its metallic content only and which therefore retains its
value because of its intrinsic character.51 In fact, however, the
drafters of the Warsaw Convention selected gold as a standard of
conversion because at the time the Convention was written the
price of gold was governed and relatively stable.52 In light of this
" See supra note 42.
46 (1975) RFDA 138 (No. 256 of 1974 Court of Appeals; 3d Dep't, Athens, Greece (Feb.
15, 1974)) (All-Language Services, Inc. trans. 1983) (available at the library of the Univer-
sity of Georgia School of Law).
41 Id. at 2-3.
46 The first increase occurred in December 1971 when the United States devalued the
dollar by 7.9 percent. This resulted in a new "official" price of U.S. $38 per troy ounce of
gold. A second increase-to U.S. $42.22 per ounce-took place in 1973. See Heller, supra
note 36, at 83-85; see also supra notes 37 and 39.
4 The early cases and literature concerning the Warsaw Convention make it clear that
the official price of gold was regarded as the standard of conversion intended by the draft-
ers. See, e.g., Clare, Evaluation of Proposals to Increase the "Warsaw Convention" Limit of
Passenger Liability, 16 J. AIR L. & COMM. 53, 57 (1949).
o [1977] LaLey 135. (All-Language Services, Inc. trans. 1983) (available at the library of
the University of Georgia School of Law).
" Id. at 3.
61 Ward, The Price of Gold and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. 70, 71 (1979).
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concern with stability, the court's choice of the free-market price
of gold is questionable since, within the last decade, that price has
experienced wide fluctuation.5"
These foreign decisions can be interpreted as judicial attempts
to soften the harsh results of the low limitation of liability reached
under the Warsaw Convention when the official price of gold is ap-
plied as a standard of conversion. However, the Convention itself
provides no authority to adopt the free-market price of gold, and
to do so is contrary to the Convention's goal of creating a stable
limitation of liability on which international air carriers can rely in
assessing their operations.
Adopting a different approach to the problem, Sweden," the
United Kingdom," the Netherlands,56 and Italy have utilized the
Special Drawing Right (SDR), a unit of account established by the
IMF using a pool of five currencies. 7 The Italian case of Linee
Aeree Italiane v. Riccioli" illustrates the line of reasoning adopted
in these countries. Riccioli held that the SDR was the appropriate
standard of conversion as it most closely reflects the underlying
intention of the Warsaw Convention that a stable standard which
is easily converted into any national currency be used for deter-
mining liability limits.59 This view is supported by the selection of
the SDR for use in the Montreal Protocols. 0 Decisions such as
Riccioli are, however, of limited value in the United States because
absent formal acceptance of the SDR through ratification of the
8 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 734 (103d ed. 1982-83).
Carriage by Air Act (1957), amendment to Chapter 9, §22, effective April 27, 1978,
cited in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d at 308 n.14.
" In the Carriage By Air (Sterling Equivalents) Order 1980, STAT. INST. 1980, Part 1, §1,
at 840-41, the Parliament announced that the SDR would be used to calculate liability lim-
its under the Warsaw Convention.
" State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping Corp., 1st May, 1981, RvdW 1981, 321 (Su-
preme Court of the Netherlands) (All-Language Services, Inc. trans. 1983) (available at the
library of the University of Georgia School of Law).
57 Prior to 1981, the value of the SDR was related to a fixed amount of 16 currencies. On
January 1, 1981, the structure of the SDR was revised so that it was made up of only five
currencies-the currencies of the IMF members with the five largest exports of goods and
services for the period 1975-79. In determining the value of one SDR, the five currencies are
given the following relative weights: the U.S. dollar 42%, the Deutsche mark 19%, and 13%
each to the French franc, the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling. See Ward, The
SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarifications, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1
(1981).
" Rome Civil Court Judgment 609/1979 (Nov. 14, 1978) (All-Language Services, Inc.
trans. 1983) (available at the library of the University of Georgia School of Law).
8 Id. at 11.
Montreal Protrocol No. 3, supra note 9.
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Montreal Protocols, such decisions amount to judicial amendment
of the Convention and therefore would violate a long-established
principal of law."'
In France, an appeals court has ruled that the current value of
the French franc must be used in calculating the Warsaw limits. In
Chamie v. Egyptair," it was recognized that the official price of
gold could not be utilized because it no longer had any interna-
tional monetary significance.68 Likewise, the court stated that the
free-market price of gold was extremely volatile and therefore con-
trary to the purpose of article 22." Egyptair included a clause on
its tickets which attempted to limit the carrier's liability to U.S.
$20.00 per kilogram for international passengers and argued that
its liability should be limited to this amount. The Court of Appeals
of Paris responded to this argument by holding that it was illegal
for Egyptair to substitute a liability limit determined by reference
to a foreign currency not convertible into gold for the system of
calculation provided by article 22.'5 The Chamie court then pro-
ceeded to apply the current French franc as a standard of conver-
sion, even though the French franc has no legal reference to gold.
No explanation was provided as to why it was acceptable for a ju-
dicial body to apply an arbitrary standard while it was not permis-
sible for the carrier to do so contractually.
C. United States Case Law Development
The confusion over the conversion standard issue is not limited
to foreign courts. In the United States, federal district courts have
61 The power to make a treaty is granted exclusively to the President, with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONsT. art. I, section 2. See generally 14 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1970). The Constitution further states that
"all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby. .. ."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. A statute, once enacted by the legislature, is rigid and may only
be changed by subsequent action of the legislature. Holtzoff, The Vitality of the Common
Law in Our Time, 16 CATH. U.L. Rav. 23, 25 (1966). Even an obsolete statute may not be
reformed by the judiciary. Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Non-Pri-
macy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REv. 203, 213 (1979) A treaty is equivalent to a statute under
the United States Constitution. An obsolete treaty such as the Warsaw Convention is, there-
fore, equivalent to an obsolete statute and should be governed by the same prohibition on
judicial reform.
'" Cours d'appel Paris (Jan. 31, 1981) (All-Language Services, Inc. trans. 1983) (available
at the library of the University of Georgia School of Law).
Id. at 12.
I d. at 4-5.
68 Id. at 13.
[Vol. 13:549
WARSAW CONVENTION IMPAIRMENT
been equally divided on the issue of the correct standard for deter-
mining the amount of the Warsaw Convention limitation of liabil-
ity. In Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc.,6 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that the free-market price of gold
is to be applied in calculating the Warsaw limits. The Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, however, maintained in In Re Air Crash Disas-
ter at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 198067 that the last official
price of gold was the appropriate conversion factor under article
22.
In 1974, a Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) order instructed air-
lines to continue basing liability limits on the 1973 official gold
standard of $42.22 per troy ounce." In light of that order, the dis-
trict court which first considered Franklin Mint6 ' held that Trans
World Airlines' $9.07 per pound limitation of liability, calculated
pursuant to the CAB's instructions, was applicable.7 0 The court
noted that the CAB order came "as close as anything to constitut-
ing a governmental interpretation of the article 22 limitation," and,
apparently under the theory that treaty-making is predominantly
the domain of the executive and legislative branches, it refused to
impose a contrary judicial interpretation.7 1 The Second Circuit, in
considering the appeal of Franklin Mint, criticized the CAB, label-
ling its position as inconsistent.72 The CAB rejects the use of SDRs
because the Senate has not approved the Montreal Protocols, said
the court, while at the same time, the CAB adopts the last official
price of gold-a price which has been explicitly rejected by the
Congress.7 8 The only foundation supporting the CAB's position
"appears to be the law of inertia.7 47 The court thus concluded that
the case for continuing to use the last official price of gold "finds
no support in law or logic." '75
The parties in Franklin Mint argued three other alternative
standards for use in interpreting article 22(2): (i) the free-market
" 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
07 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
U Civil Aeronautics Board, Order 74-1-16, Dkt. 26274, adopted Jan. 3, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg.
1526 (1974).
11 525 F. Supp. 1288 (1981).
70 Id.
Id. at 1289.
,' 690 F.2d at 310.
78 Id.
74 Id.
I1 d. at 309.
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price of gold, (ii) the exchange value of the current French franc,
and (iii) the SDR.1 The court disposed of the free-market price of
gold and the currrent franc as possible standards with little discus-
sion, noting only that these were never agreed to by the Warsaw
Convention framers and are "gross departures" from the purposes
of the Convention.77 In rejecting the application of SDRs as a stan-
dard, the court said that since the Congress had not adopted SDRs
through ratification of the Montreal Protocols, the court was with-
out authority to do so. 78 "Substitution of a new term is a political
question, unfit for judicial resolution. 7 9
The problem presented in Franklin Mint is straightforward. The
Warsaw Convention contains a conversion standard based on the
"official" price of gold. That price has been explicitly repealed by
the Congress and a substitute standard has not been properly au-
thorized. When a term has not been provided by the executive
branch or the Senate, the court may not create a term. The Second
Circuit was merely following well-established rules of law in refus-
ing to engage in judicial treaty-making.80
D. Reaction to the Franklin Mint Decision
Although the importance of Franklin Mint was instantly appar-
ent to the international aviation community,81 the impact of the
decision was broader in scope and came more quickly than antici-
pated. In less than five months, a California district court relied on
the reasoning in Franklin Mint to declare the Warsaw Convention
limitation of liability for personal injury unenforceable. In In Re
Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea on November 18,
1980,82 the court noted that the Warsaw Convention liability limit
for personal injury, like the limit for loss of cargo, was based on the
official price of gold and, therefore, could not be enforced in
United States courts.83 The Kimpo decision discusses neither the
existence of the Montreal Agreement nor that the limit set in that
document is not tied to a gold standard.
76 See id. at 310.
77 Id.
'1 Id. at 311.
79 Id.
" See supra note 61.
"' See, e.g., Hemingway, Eddy & Lev, Liability Treaty Given Push by Court Rulings,
AIRCARGO MAG. 20 (Dec. 1982) (statements of various air transport industry officials).
82 558 F. Supp. 72 (D.C. Ca. 1983).
63 Id. at 75.
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IV. Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines: THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM
The Franklin Mint decision came as a surprise; it was preceded
by little serious debate in either the courts or the air transport
industry." The same cannot be said of Stratis v. Eastern Air
Lines. Many of the policy considerations which influenced the
Stratis decision have been the subject of debate for more than fifty
years.85
Before examining the Stratis decision, it is necessary to look
more closely at the policy issues governing the outcome of Warsaw
Convention cases. It is easy for a court to be dispassionate in deal-
ing with the liability limits of article 22(2) relating to cargo. Most
transportation of international cargo by air is done in a commercial
context. The limitation of liability provisions merely serve to shift
the burden of insurance from the carrier to the shipper, just as any
commercial exculpatory clause is used to shift the burden of insur-
ance from one party to another. In contrast, nearly all claims
under article 22(1) of the Convention are brought by ordinary indi-
viduals-individuals who cannot be held to the same standards of
knowledge and sophistication as a commercial enterprise. Further-
more, without the liability limits provided by the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the average level of recovery in death and personal injury
cases would be exponentially higher than the average award for
loss of cargo. Courts, then, are torn between conflicting policy goals
in considering Warsaw Convention cases. Although they want to
provide adequate recovery for those killed and injured in aircraft
disasters, they also want to shield airlines from the catastrophic
financial effects of a major air crash and to maintain a uniform
treatment of claims in an international setting. The result has been
a series of decisions which contorts the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention to reach a variety of results."
" The court took judicial notice of this fact and made its ruling prospective, taking effect
60 days after the decision was handed down. Franklin Mint v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
690 F.2d at 311-12.
" In fact, dissatisfaction with the amount of the liability limits--one of the chief policy
discussions concerning the Warsaw Convention-began as early as 1935, the year after the
United States became a party to the Convention. See Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and
the Hague Protocol, 23 J. Am L. & Com. 253 (1956). See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 1, at 502.
" A number of courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover amounts greater than the Warsaw
Convention limits by adopting a number of legal theories to avoid the application of the
Convention. These cases include: Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 856 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965), and Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 234
F.Supp. 223 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev'd, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965) (finding that a ticket had
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A. Stratis v. Eastern Airlines and Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention
Efstratios Stratis was a seaman on a Greek ship, the S.S. Paros.
Suffering from phimosis, he requested a discharge from ship's
duty, which was granted on June 23, 1975 at Baton Rouge, Louisi-
ana.87 His Seaman's Articles, Greek law, and the immigration laws
of the United States required that Stratis be repatriated at the ex-
pense of the vessel's owner.88 Furthermore, federal law required
that Stratis make "definite arrangements" to depart from the
United States before he would be allowed to enter the country
from his ship.8 9 Arrangements were made for Stratis to fly from
Baton Rouge to New Orleans on Delta Airlines and from New Or-
leans to New York on the same day via Eastern Airlines. He then
was to connect at New York's John F. Kennedy International Air-
port (JFK) with an Olympic Airways flight to Athens. Stratis was
given a ticket covering only the domestic Delta and Eastern flights,
although a ticket for the Olympic flight was prepared (but not vali-
dated) at the American Airlines desk at JFK. Stratis was in-
structed to pick it up upon arrival in New York. Unfortunately,
Eastern flight 66 crashed while attempting to land at JFK, and
Stratis sustained burns and a cervical fracture. As a result of the
air crash and later negligent medical treatment at a nearby hospi-
tal, Stratis was rendered quadraplegic. 90
In the subsequent suit for damages, Eastern asserted the affirm-
ative defense of limitation of liability under the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Montreal Agreement. 1 Stratis successfully moved for
not been delivered on time); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 253 F.Supp. 237
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S.
455 (1968) (finding that a ticket, though delivered, contained an inadequate warning con-
cerning the liability limits); In Re Air Crash at Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal.
1978) (finding that the passenger's survivors were not in privity with the airline and, there-
fore, were not bound by the limitation in the contract); Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World
Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding that the carrier committed an act of willfull
misconduct).
Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 409.
- Id.
8 U.S.C. §1282(a); 8 C.F.R. §252.1(c) and (d) (1952).
Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d. at 408.
* Eastern argued that it had delivered a passenger ticket for the flight during which the
accident occurred containing the required notice of liability limits and that the overall con-
tract was one within the meaning of article 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention, which states:
(3) Transportation to be performed by successive air carriers is deemed, for pur-
poses of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage if it has been regarded by
the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form
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partial summary judgment, striking the affirmative defense, on the
ground that the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable because he
was travelling on a ticket for domestic travel only.e" The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the is-
sue of Eastern's Warsaw Convention defense, holding that where a
prepaid ticket for an international flight has been issued though
not validated or delivered, a contract for international transporta-
tion has been made and the passenger could not cancel the inter-
national portion of the journey without running afoul of his com-
mitments to the immigration authorities, and where the passenger
has been delivered a ticket from a domestic carrier that contained
an adequate notice of the Warsaw system liability limitations, the
passenger is assumed to know that the flight was international and
that the Warsaw Convention, and thus the liability limit, is appli-
cable." In so deciding, the Second Circuit deviated from a recent
trend by United States courts to construe article 22(1) of the War-
saw Convention so as to avoid the harsh results of its liability lim-
its in personal injury cases."
The Stratis court's discussion of the Warsaw Convention de-
fense focused upon the apparently contradictory language of arti-
cle 3. Under article 3(1), the carrier "must deliver a passenger tick-
et" containing specific information before it can claim the
protection of the liability limitation provided by article 22.95 In
of a single contract or a series of contracts, and it does not lose its international
character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed
entirely within the territory of the same State.
See Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 410.
" Stratis maintained, inter alia, that the ticket which had been issued to him did not
meet the requirements of article 3(1)(b) because it did not list an international destination.
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
" Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 412-13.
"4 See generally Recent Developments in Aviation Case Law, 47 J. Ant L. 651, 672 (1982)
(citing Manion v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 80 A.D.2d 303, 439 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1981)
as "one of the rare recent decisions holding the Warsaw Convention applicable." Manion
was later reversed. 449 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Ct. App. 1982)). See also Maximizing Passenger Re-
covery Under the Warsaw Convention, 34 WASH. & LEn L Rzv. 141 (1977); Comment,
supra note 2.
Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, provides as follows:
For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket
which shall contain the following particulars
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right
to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises that right,
the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its inter-
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contrast, article 3(2) mandates that "the absence, irregularity or
loss of the passenger ticket shall not effect the existence or the
validity of the contract of transportation, which shall nonetheless
be subject to the rules of this convention." 96 The question in this
case was whether the failure of Stratis' ticket to list his ultimate
destination as required by article 3(1)(b) 97 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion resulted in a failure to deliver an international ticket or
whether it was merely a technical irregularity which, under article
3(2), would not preclude the application of liability limits." The
court decided the latter, saying that the language of article 3
clearly was contradictory and could be interpreted either way.'
The dissent found the majority's reasoning somewhat strained.
Judge Newman pointed out that article 3(2) can be read so as to
avoid any contradiction with article 3(1). 100 Article 3(1) requires
that the carrier "deliver" a passenger ticket. Article 3(2) clearly
can be construed to mean that once a ticket has been delivered, its
subsequent "absence, irregularity or loss" does not impair the con-
tract of transportation or remove the liability limits. Judge New-
man explained that "[w]ith delivery, there is limited liability even
if the ticket is later absent; without delivery there is no limitation
of liability."10 1 Under this interpretation of the language of article
3, the majority's reliance on article 3(2) is misplaced. Viewed from
this perspective, article 3(2) serves not as a loosening of the deliv-
ery requirement, but as a reinforcement of article 3(1).101 For the
national character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liabil-
ity established by this convention. ....
Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, continues: "Nevertheless, if the
carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be
entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability." Eastern argued, and the court apparently agreed, that it had delivered "a passen-
ger ticket" for the accident flight and that the omission of the final destination is merely an
irregularity not affecting the validity of the contract of transportation (emphasis added).
This is a curious argument in light of the statement in Judge Newman's dissent that "East-
ern had no idea that Stratis was on the domestic leg of an international journey and thus
had no occasion to adjust its liability insurance in light of such a circumstance." Stratis v.
Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 419 n.7.
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(b). For the text of the article, see supra
note 95.
" Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 409.
" Id. at 412.
100 Id. at 417.
101 Id. at 419.
'" Indeed, under the generally recognized principles of treaty interprets tion, article 3
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ticket to be "absent" or "lost," it must first have been delivered.
The purpose of the delivery requirement of article 3 is to ensure
that international passengers have notice that their flights are sub-
ject to the Warsaw Convention limitation of liability and that they
have a reasonable opportunity to take precautions against that
limit.1 0 3 The Stratis court recognizes this purpose generally,10 but
gives a very limited interpretation of notice. According to the ma-
jority, the question is not whether Stratis knew that his domestic
flight could be subject to the Warsaw Convention as a leg of an
international flight under article 3(1), but whether he had reason
to know his overall flight was international. The court then found
that if Stratis did not know that his overall flight was interna-
tional, he lacked a reasonable opportunity to buy insurance or take
other precautions against the limitation of liability, but that if he
were aware that his overall flight was international, the Warsaw
Convention requires that his domestic flight be subject to the
limitation.10'
Implicit in the holding of Stratis is the idea that the average
airline passenger, holding a ticket for a domestic flight only, would
understand that the Warsaw Convention liability limits apply to
that ticket so long as the passenger had an ultimate destination in
another country. While it is true that the notice of the limitation
of liability which was printed on Stratis' domestic ticket did refer
to any journey "involving an ultimate destination or a stop in a
country other than the country of origin,"' 6 it is unlikely that the
should be read in precisely this manner. Whenever possi ble, treaty provisions should be
construed so as to support and explain, rather than contradict, each other. See In re Air
Crash in Bali, Indo nesia, 462 F.Supp. 1114, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1978), citing Bernier v. Bernier,
147 U.S. 242 (1893); See also 14 M. WHrSMAN, supra note 61, at 353-58.
! See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 370 F.2d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 1966).
Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 411.
' See id. at 412.
106 The Eastern ticket issued to Stratis contained two notices. The first notice read in
part as follows:
ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL PASSENGERS
ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a stop in a country
other than the country of origin are advised that the provisions of a treaty known
as the Warsaw Convention may be applicable to the entire journey, including
any portion entirely within the country of origin or destina- tion. For such passen-
gers on a journey to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United States
of America, the Con- vention and special contracts of carriage embodied in ap-
plica- ble tariffs provide that the liability of certain carriers, parties to such spe-
cial contracts, for death of or personal injury to passengers is limited in most
cases to proven damages not to exceed U.S. $75,000 per passenger, and that this
1983]
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average passenger would realize that the liability limit would apply
to a flight which was not on his international ticket.10 7 Indeed, it is
not unreasonable to suppose that many passengers holding a ticket
for a purely domestic flight might fail to read a notice entitled
"Advice to International Passengers on Limitation of Liability.'90 8
The Stratis case is the most recent example of judicially inter-
preting the language of the Warsaw Convention to reach a desired
outcome. In Stratis, the Second Circuit held that the Warsaw Con-
vention limitation of liability for personal injury could be applied
to a passenger who was contemplating an international flight, but
liabili- ty up to such limit shall not depend on negligence on the part of the car-
rier. The limit of liability of U.S. $75,000 above is inclusive of legal fees and costs
except that in case of a claim brought in a state where provision is made for
separate award of legal fees and costs, the limit shall be the sum of U.S. $58,000
exclusive of legal fees and costs. For such pas- sengers traveling by a carrier not a
party to such special contracts or on a journey not to, from, or having an agreed
stopping place in the United States of America, liability of the carrier for death
or personal injury to passengers is limi- ted in most cases to approximately U.S.
$10,000 or U.S. $20,000. The names of carriers, parties to such special contracts,
are available at all ticket offices of such carriers and may be examined on request.
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing insurance from a
private company. Such insurance is not affected by any limitation of the carrier's
liability under the Warsaw Convention or such special contracts of carriage. For
further information please consult your air line or insurance company
representative.
The second notice read as follows:
NOTICE
If the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destina tion or stop in a country
other than the country of departure the Warsaw Convention may be applicable
and the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for
death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage. See also
notice headed "Advice to International Pas sengers on Limitation of Liability."
Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 413.
'07 Consider the Second Circuit's remarks in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A.,
370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), on the difficulty of providing adequate notice of the applicabil-
ity of the Convention to international flights:
[Niotice to passengers is especially important in this country where the over-
whelming number of people who travel by air do so on domestic flights.... It is
too much to expect these passengers to be sufficiently sophisticated to realize that
although they are traveling the same number of miles on an international flight
that they have frequently traveled domes- tically, the amount they may recover in
the event of an acci- dent is drastically reduced.
Id. at 513. If it is "too much to expect" that passengers holding international tickets will
understand the general terms of the Warsaw Convention without explicit notice, surely it is
unreasonable to expect passengers holding domestic tickets to comprehend the finer techni-
cal points of the agreement. In fact, this might be one reason why the drafters of the Con-
vention chose to require the delivery of an international ticket.
"' Judge Newman suggests this argument in his dissent. Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682
F.2d at 418.
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who held a ticket soley for domestic travel.ee The language of the
ticketing provisions is not precise and is open to interpretation by
the courts. However, the purpose behind article 3 is clear: it is
designed to assure that passengers have adequate notice that their
flight is subject to the terms of the Convention and a reasonable
opportunity to take precautions against the limitation of the car-
rier's liability.1 0 The interpretation of article 3 in Stratis is con-
trary to that purpose and, therefore, oversteps the bounds of ac-
ceptable treaty construction."
V. PROSPECTS FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
PROBLEM
The Stratis decision is merely the latest round in a debate which
has existed for more than fifty years over the limitations of an air
carrier's liability for personal injury.11'2 There are almost as many
opinions concerning the Warsaw system as there are observers of
the international air transportation scene.118 Virtually all commen-
tators on the regulation of international air travel, however, agree
on two points: some uniform treatment of claims arising from in-
ternational air transportation is needed 14 and the liability limit set
by the Warsaw system is woefully inadequate. 15
The treatment of the Warsaw Convention by United States
courts has demonstrated considerable confusion and disagreement
over how the Convention is to be interpreted.116 This "havoc in the
109 Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 412-14.
10 See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 370 F.2d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 1966);
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 856 (2d Cir. 1965).
14 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 61, at 634.
", See supra notes 85 and 86.
See, e.g., Mateesco-Matte, supra note 2; Sozer, Consolidation of the Warsaw/Hague
System, 25 McGn.L L.J. 217 (1979); Hollings, Montreal Protocols: A Threat to the Ameri-
can System of Jurisprudence, 18 TRAL 69 (1982). Note, The Warsaw Treaty: The Quid Pro
Quo, 29 U. PrrT. L. Rav. 253 (1967).
"' See Bockstiegel, supra note 2.
13 Dissatisfaction with the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention began to emerge as
early as 1935, the year after the United States ratified the treaty. See supra note 85. For an
excellent discussion of how inflation has dramatically enlarged the insufficiency of recovery
under the Warsaw system (even under the proposed modification of Convention by the
Montreal Protocols), see Comment, supra note 2, at 838-58.
"' For example, United States courts appear to have applied at least three tests to deter-
mine whether a passenger is in the process of "embarking" under article 17(1). In Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1955), a
case resulting from a terrorist attack on passengers boarding an aircraft, the court adopted a
tripartite test based on what the plaintiffs were doing, under whose control, and at what
location. However, in another case arising from that same terrorist attack, the court in
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courts" 117 has resulted primarily from judicial reaction to the ineq-
uities of the low liability limits set by the Convention.118 Courts
around the country have examined the purposes of the Warsaw
Convention, and opinions regarding its applicability run the spec-
trum between two extremes. Some federal district courts seem to
have adopted the position that while the limitation of liability pro-
vided by article 22 may have furthered the original purpose of pro-
viding a cost-allocation mechanism to protect a growing airline in-
dustry from the catastrophic effects of liability for a major aircraft
accident,"1' that purpose is obsolete in today's world of modern,
safe jet travel.12 0 The Second Circuit, however, sees this purpose of
the Convention as very much intact. In reviewing Warsaw Conven-
tion cases, the Second Circuit generally has sought to allow recov-
ery outside of the Warsaw limits, but has refused to contradict the
clear language of the Convention in doing so. In Reed v. Wiser,121
it was acknowledged that an increase in the liability limit is
needed. Nevertheless, the decision stated that "at no time has this
country ever abandoned the basic principle that, whatever the lim-
its may be, air carriers should be protected from having to pay out
more than a fixed and definite sum for passenger injuries sustained
in international air disasters.1 22
The difficulty, of course, is establishing precisely how large the
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 369 F.Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd 550 F.2d
152 (3d Cir. 1977), applied a broad test based solely on a geographic area surrounding the
aircraft to acheive an opposite result. Although the Third Circuit reversed the Evangelinos
decision and adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Day, the court's opinion con-
tained a sharply worded dissent. The dissenting judges would apply a two-tiered geographi-
cal test which on its face appears more restrictive than the Day test. See Comment, supra
note 2, at 831-32.
I' Sheinfeld, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limi-
tations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. Am L. & CoM. 653, 656 (1980).
118 Even the Stratis court acknowledged the inequity of the limitation of liability; how-
ever, it maintained that "the possible unfairness of the Convention is no reason to construe
it narrowly." Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 412 (citing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)).
n. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 499-500.
", At the time the Warsaw Convention was adopted, the Lockheed Vega, which carried
six passengers with a cruising speed of approximately 120 mph and a range of only 550
miles, was the most advanced aircraft in airline service. In the years 1929 to 1936, there was
approximately one fatality per 1.05 million passenger miles of air travel. By 1965, that figure
had been reduced to about .55 fatality per million passenger miles, making air travel nearly
twice as safe. See Comment, supra note 2, at 767 n.14; See also C. Gmis-SMrrH, THE AmRo-
PLANK: AN HisTompc SuRvav 97-100 (1960).
121 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
In Id. at 1089.
570 [Vol. 13:549
19831 WARSAW CONVENTION IMPAIRMENT
liability limit should be. In an international setting involving na-
tions whose standards of living range from wealthy to desperately
poor,12 the task is still more complicated. What might constitute a
sufficient recovery for a citizen of one country could be wholly in-
sufficient for the citizen of another. The Stratis case provides one
illustration of the problem. In the district court's holding against
the United States government, it found that the plaintiff's future
expenses for attendant care in Greece over his life expectancy of
38.5 years would be $335,230.11 ' However, in Eastern's trial the
jury was allowed to determine the question of costs for attendant
care if Stratis remained in the United States, and the plaintiff's
evidence showed that more than $2 million would be required to
provide attendant care in this country.15 Thus, it seems clear that
a sufficient recovery-one large enough to provide for a victim's
future needs 126-can be more than six times as large in the United
States as it is in Greece.
Finding a workable system of liability limits which adequately
addresses the needs of the more than 100 signatories to the Con-
vention has proved to be a vexing task. The Montreal Protocol No.
3 provides what is perhaps the best solution offered to date. It ap-
proaches the problem of insufficient recovery by expressly permit-
ting nations to adopt a supplemental compensation plan (SCP), so
long as the plan does not impose any additional liability on air
carriers.12 7 The SCP provision, contained in article 35A of the Re-
""5 Compare, for example, per capita income in the United States ($8,612 for 1978) with
per capita income in El Salvador ($639 for 1978). Both nations are parties to the Warsaw
Convention. (Statistics from THi WORLD ALMAmAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1983.)
12 Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d at 408.
125 Id.
", See Comment, supra note 2. The authors suggest that the United States government
does not approach the Warsaw Convention with this definition of a sufficient recovery.
Rather, they submit that the government views sufficiency of recovery in terms of providing
an adequate recovery to a large enough percentage of accident victims. Id. at 838-839 (citing
Hearings on Aviation Protocols before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (July 26, 1977) (statement of Linda H. Kamm)).
Article 35A of the Warsaw Convention, as revised by the Montreal Protocols, states:
No provision contained in this Convention shall prevent a State from establishing
and operating within its territory a system to supplement the compensation paya-
ble to claimants under the Convention in respect of death, or personal injury, of
passengers. Such a system shall fulfill the following conditions:
a) it shall not in any circumstances impose upon the carrier, his servants or
agents, any liability in addition to that provided under this Convention;
b) it shall not impose upon the carrier any financial or administrative burden
other than collecting in that State contributions from passengers if required so to
do;
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vised Warsaw Convention, is of fundamental importance to the
United States. In fact, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
approval of Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 is conditional upon the es-
tablishment and continued functioning of a satisfactory SCP.128
The CAB approved the United States SCP without conducting
hearings on the final draft of the plan.'" e The plan selected was put
forth by the Prudential Insurance Company of America; it would
cover international passengers for proven damages up to $200,000
over the carrier's maximum liability of 100,000 SDRs (approxi-
mately $117,000) under Montreal Protocol No. 3.130 Thus, the total
amount of damages recoverable under the Revised Warsaw System
is $317,000. To finance the SCP, each international passenger
would pay a ticket surcharge of $2.00. Funds collected from the
surcharge would be used to establish a pool from which claims
would be paid. 13
The United States SCP has been the subject of harsh criticism
and was met with staunch opposition in the Senate. 2 The thrust
of the criticism is three-fold. First, a total recovery of only
$317,000 would leave a large number of United States nationals
c) it shall not give rise to any discrimination between carriers with regard to the
passengers concerned and the benefits available to said passengers under the sys-
tem shall be extended to them regardless of the carrier whose services they have
used;
d) if a passenger has contributed to the system, any person suffering damage as
a consequence of death or personal injury of such passenger shall be entitled to
the benefits of the system.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 879-80.
'" The Protocols were transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in January
1977, at the end of President Ford's administration. Although hearings on the revised War-
saw Convention were held on July 26, i977, it was not until 1981 that the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations recommended ratification of the Montreal Protocols. The Committee's
support of the Protocols, however, was conditional on the "establishment and continued
functioning of a satisfactory Supplemental Compensation Plan, as envisaged under Article
35A of the revised convention, to increase substantially the recoveries available to U.S. citi-
zens." S. Exac. REP. No. 45, supra note 17, at 1.
"n Agreement to Establish Supplemental Compensation Plan Pursuant to Article 35A of
the Warsaw Convention, as Amended at The Hague, 1955, at Guatemala City, 1971, and by
the Additional (Montreal) Protocol No. 3 of Montreal, 1975, CAB Agreement No. 25632,
adopted July 20, 1977, Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. 77-7-85 (July 20, 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Supplemental Compensation Plan]. For the historical development of the Sup-
plemental Compensation Plan, see Comment, supra note 2, at 782-84.
"8 Comments in Support of Supplemental Compensation Agreement, Before the Civil
Aeronautics Board, Docket No. 28713, at 7-10 (Dec. 31, 1975) (statement of Paul R. Ignau-
tius, Pres., Air Transp. Ass'n of America).
Supplemental Compensation Plan, supra note 129.
" See, e.g., Hollings, supra note 2.
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unable to recover the total amount of their actual damages.138 Sec-
ond, critics claim that unlimited insurance is available to the carri-
ers for a per-passenger cost which is far below the $2.00 surcharge
proposed by the SCP.1 " Finally, it is noted that the SCP is not
insurance, and therefore the international passenger would pay
more for the privilege of recovering proven damages up to $200,000
than it would cost to procure insurance for unlimited recovery. 136
The evidence supporting the claim that the surcharge is greater
than the cost of insurance is contradictory and inconclusive, ac-
cording to the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
recommending ratification of the Montreal Protocols. 13" Even if
the claim were to be substantiated, however, it would call only for
a re-evaluation of the SCP and not, as some have suggested, for an
abandonment of the entire limitation of liability system estab-
lished by the Revised Warsaw System. In any event, the issue
would appear to be moot since the Senate's rejection of the Mon-
treal Protrocols makes it unlikely that the Prudential plan will
ever be implemented.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Franklin Mint decision declares the Warsaw Convention li-
ability limits for loss of cargo unenforceable for want of a legally
valid standard of conversion. While that decision is binding only in
the Second Circuit, early reaction to the opinion indicates that the
Convention soon may be invalidated in other jurisdictions. Indeed,
it would appear that some courts will be willing to extend the rea-
soning of Franklin Mint to find the liability limits for personal in-
jury unenforceable as well. Selection of a conversion standard is
not within the purview of the courts; it is a function of the legisla-
tive and executive branches. Therefore, should the reasoning of
Franklin Mint be adopted widely, the rejection of the Montreal
Protocols by the United States Senate will ensure that the Conven-
tion dies a swift death.
There is some evidence that the courts approve of the funda-
mental principles of limited liability which the Warsaw Convention
'" See Hearings on Aviation Protocols before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (Sept. 29, 1981) (prepared statement of Alan J. Konigsberg)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).
See Hollings, supra note 2, at 70.
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 133, at 14.
" S. Exac. REP. No. 45, supra note 17, at 7.
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embodies, even though it is clear that they generally consider the
amount of the limits to be too low. Just three months before it
handed down its decision in Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit
ruled in the case of Stratis v. Eastern Airlines that the Warsaw
Convention limitation of liability for personal injury could be ap-
plied to a passenger who was contemplating an international flight
but who held a ticket solely for domestic travel. The Stratis case
represents the most liberal interpretation of the Convention's tick-
eting provisions ever applied to allow limitation of a recovery. In
extending the amount of protection afforded the air carrier at the
expense of the passenger, the court reaffirmed its approval of the
concept of limited liability. As noted above, however, the courts
have no power to correct a technical deficiency such as the one
which has arisen over the invalidity of the Convention's gold
clause. The survival of the Warsaw system of limited liability
therefore rests in the hands of the legislative and executive
branches. Unless negotiations are begun on a new agreement in the
near future, the Warsaw system cannot survive.
Alan N. Sutin
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